Shaky financial times leave only the most stable business models standing. Mark Phillips spoke to Protiviti top guns about damaged corporate reputations, regulatory pressures and the role of internal audit going forward.
The current financial crisis is a good example
of what can happen when the inherent risks
associated with aggressive, growth-oriented
market strategies are discounted, ignored or never
even considered.
Industry losses from sub-prime mortgages are
expected to reach as much as $US400 billion ($620
billion), with at least one in four of the risky home
loans going into default. The root causes are many –
breakdowns in time-tested underwriting standards,
failures to provide or obtain adequate disclosures,
excess reliance on flawed rating agency assessments
of structured products, to name a few.
But not every financial institution played the sub-
prime game recklessly. Some firms identified the
sources of significant risk as early as 2006 and had
as much as a year to evaluate the magnitude of the
risk and implement cost-effective plans to reduce
their exposure.
Sceptical of rating agency assessments, others devel
oped their own in-house expertise to assess credit qual
ity. Some even tested their assessments by selling a
small percentage of assets to obtain reliable pricing
data points. These and other actions resulted in a sig
nificant redirection of market focus and gave the firms
a seat in the ring when the proverbial music stopped,
leaving their unfortunate competitors standing for all
to see and scrutinise.
The firms that succeeded in minimising their losses
protected enterprise value by engaging in sub-prime
lending with an appropriate assessment of the under
lying risk and took action to reduce their exposure
when it was practical to do so. Not surprisingly, some
financial institutions did not engage in sub-prime
lending at all – their underwriting standards did not
permit the practice.
Reputational risk
The bottom line is that firms that instigated steps
to protect their balance sheets or honoured the pru
dent constraints imposed by their longstanding
internal practices and processes have placed them
selves in a strong competitive position relative to
their weakened peers. Those firms that placed
enormous bets on the sub-prime market have
destroyed enterprise value that took them years to
build. It will almost certainly take years for them
to recover, rebuild the lost value and restore lustre
to their tarnished reputations.
Of course, the finance sector is not alone in the
dangers it faces with regards to reputational risk,
but in the context of today’s financial turmoil, it is
worth noting that a PwC study conducted as far
back as 2004 pointed to a gap between the pro
cesses designed to keep financial services organi
sations in line with their regulatory obligations and
the policies that are needed to protect and add value
to the business.
“Financial services organisations that fail to recog
nise and close the gap between the box-ticking
approach to compliance and the totality of risks they
run are extremely vulnerable to reputational risk,” the
PricewaterhouseCoopers study stated. It found that
less than a fifth of respondents considered awareness
of compliance-related risk to be high across all parts of the business. Fewer than a quarter were very
confident that their organisation was in full com
pliance with regulatory requirements and internal
codes and policies.
“Reputational risk is priceless,” says US-based
Joseph Tarantino, president and CEO of Protiviti, a
global consulting and internal audit firm specialising
in risk and advisory services. “When a business deals
with the public and is reliant on public and investor
confidence, it is hard to put a value on it. However, in
any risk assessment of an organisation that relies on
public confidence, reputational risk is always one of
the top five risks faced.
“What it comes down to is senior management
putting in place effective control and risk manage
ment structures to provide them with a level of com
fort that the company’s reputation is being protected
at every step of the way – from both operating and
internal oversight standpoints.
“Management needs input that the corporate direc
tives, policies and direction that have been laid out
are effectively operating in the way intended.
“As there are frequently also environmental risks to
reputation that may not be in their control, it is incum
bent on them to be informed and then nimble in being
able to respond rather than to react to such matters.”
Transparency
In Australia, the recent example of ANZ bank around
the Opes Prime securities lending has been charac
terised as one where perhaps even board members
were not aware of the full extent of the business
activities conducted within the organisation.
“With regards to reputational risk,” says Protiviti
Australia managing director Gary Anderson, “while
regulations have not required companies to publicly
disclose what their risks are and what they are doing
about them, the issues around ANZ will have height
ened directors’ awareness that they absolutely need
transparency on what business activities and trans
actions the organisation is really entering into.
“This is where internal audit and risk manage
ment are some of the most powerful tools,” Ander
son says. “The more experienced directors of larger
companies, in particular, are very diligently digging
into what is happening in their organisations and
putting management under a lot of pressure through
independent reviews.
“There are, perhaps, a lot of small- and mid-sized
companies where that level of rigour has not been
applied in the past, but I think all directors will be
demanding a lot more transparency going forward.
Scenario modelling
“Most companies have also traditionally done a fair
amount of modelling of scenarios as part of their
strategic planning or risk assessment process. They
have built models where they forecast exchange
rates, labour rates, inflation, equity prices and so
on,” says Anderson.
“Now, in extreme economic conditions, the
underlying integrity of those models is being tested.
I know of a number of companies that are placing
a greater emphasis on those models being indepen
dently assessed – to determine how robust they are
in terms of their underlying assumptions and if they
have pushed scenarios to an extreme that perhaps
people did not think was possible. Clearly, as the
financial crisis demonstrates, these scenarios do
have to be played out.”
Increased regulation
In wake of the seriousness of global economic con
ditions, it was perhaps inevitable that a call for
greater regulation of the financial markets would be
made. As noted on page 8 of this issue of Risk Man
agement, members of governance body Chartered
Secretaries Australia are calling for increased debate
on the international regulation of global financial
markets. But is such a move appropriate, or are we
in danger of creating an even more onerous version
of Sarbanes-Oxley – possibly for little positive effect?
“There is a sentiment in the market for more regu
lation and more consistent regulation around financial
markets companies,” Tarantino acknowledges.
“Clearly the banking sector is heavily regulated,
and so is insurance, although that is more decen
tralised. The regulation authorities in the States have
been with the states, as opposed to the Federal Gov
ernment, and, as such, some would suggest that reg
ulation of the insurance sector is not as strong as with
the banking industry.
“Certain other segments of financial services,
such as the investment banking industry, are not as
regulated, and as a result of recent events the two
remaining investment banks, Morgan Stanley and
Goldman Sacs, have become banks. There is also
the hedge fund industry, which is not regulated, and
holds billions of billions of dollars in assets and, to
a large extent, finance companies like GMAC (the
finance arm of US car giant General Motors) are
also not regulated.
“It is premature to draw any analogy between
what may happen to SOX, as we just do not know
what is going to evolve. But a desire to have more
oversight and more consistent oversight over enti
ties performing comparable activities is probably a
reasonable expectation.”
Internal controls
He rejects any suggestion that growing regulatory
pressures have the potential to stretch corporate
resources to the point where they actually engender
a box-ticking approach to compliance, pointing out
that more regulation has forced organisations to
implement new procedures and controls.
“As a result of Sarbanes-Oxley and clearly com
ing out of this financial crisis, the internal audit
function will take on a heightened role. Not in any
tick-the-box context, but as a key component of cor
porate governance structure and internal controls,”
Tarantino says.
“In any organisation where there are strong entity-
level controls there would also be a view of the inter
nal audit function being an advisor to senior
management as opposed to a tick-the-box function.
Sound corporate governance practices demand a strong
internal audit function – one with a level of indepen
dence and objectivity and that provides consultative
advice and oversight to senior management.”
Financial bailout
It has been noted by many industry observers (and
politicians and angry taxpayers) that one of the
ironies of the current financial situation is that it has
– arguably of necessity – created a political para
dox. After all, is it not something of a contradiction
for governments to bail out at taxpayer’s expense –
and in some cases actually guarantee – financial
institutions in a capitalist/free market environment?
“Some would view it as an inherent conflict
within that context”, Tarantino concedes, “but what
has transpired is more a reaction towards restoring
investor confidence and governments taking action
they feel is appropriate in order to stabilise the mar
ket. It is not something, I think, that they would
assert would last forever, but one aimed at allowing
businesses and financial institutions to interact and
do business with each other.
“From the US standpoint, there is also significant
change in the way the crisis is being handled from when
(in 1989) the Resolution Trust Corporation was estab
lished (as a consequence of the savings and loan crisis
of the 1980s). In this case the Government is effectively
following the European model by investing capital into
these entities to allow them to continue to operate and
manage their assets. The feeling is that this will help to
preserve more value within the asset pools such that
taxpayers may not have to bear a disproportionate
amount of the cost of the whole bailout.”